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There is great excitement in the medical community about the propsects
of fetal tissue transplantation. Abraham Lieberman of the New York
University Medical Center put it this way: "Fetal tissue transplantation is to
medicine as superconductivity is to physics".· Yet Arthur Caplan, Director
of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota, has
called the ethical dimensions of this issue "the ticking time bomb of medical
ethics".2
The use of fetal tissue is actually part of a long-established tradition of
using fetal cells in research. For example, the 1954 Nobel Prize for Medicine
was awarded for a polio vaccine that was developed from fetal kidney cells.
In addition, fetal cells were used in the production of a widely used vaccine
for measles. 3 However in the early use of fetal cells, the source was only
spontaneous abortions, and perhaps ectopic pregnancies, not elective, nontherapeutic abortions.
Fetal tissue is good source of transplant material due to its potential for
growth, its ability to differentiate, its ability to integrate into the recipient,
and is less subject to rejection in the transplant process. 4 In addition, it is
currently in high supply.
There are many different potential uses offetal tissue for transplants, but
the focus to date has been on the treatment of Parkinson's disease and
diabetes. Using Parkinson's disease as an example, where the technology is
most advanced, here is how a transplant of fetal tissue alleviates some ofthe
symptoms.S The disease affects the part of the brain known as the substantia
nigra, when the neurons there begin to disintegrate, thus the production of
dopamine is impaired. As a result, the patient experiences motor difficulty,
rigidity, tremor, and even dementia, eventually rendering him unable to
carryon any normal functions. As is the case with all neurological diseases,
the tissue that is destroyed is incapable of regeneration. The neurologic
tissue from the human fetus is transplanted into the brain of the recipient
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and within weeks the tissue begins to secrete dopamine. This represents an
alternative to the customary drug therapy that contains dopamine
precursors or drugs which stimulate greater dopamine release by the
existing health5' neurons in the brain. 6
At present, there is adequate available tissue from elective abortions to
meet the need of sufferers of Parkinson's disease.1 However, should the
technology develop as anticipated and be effective in treating a wide variety
of degenerative diseases, the amount of tissue would fall far short of the
demand. 8
It would be ethically less troubling if the tissue from spontaneous
abortions was adquate for use in the transplants. However, there are three
primary problems with this tissue. 9 First, in spontaneous abortion, there is a
significant incidence of chromosomal abnormality, which is the primary
cause of most miscarriages. Second, depending on the time lapse between
the death of the fetus and the retrieval of the tissue, hypoxia may render the
tissue non-functional. Third, there is a higher incidence of infection in
spontaneously aborted fetuses that could be passed on to the recipient.
However, it should be noted that the risk of infection still exists with tissue
from elective abortions. The existence of microorganisms in the tissue from
spontaneous abortions has led some to suggest that it should not be used at
all in the transplants. lo
State of the Science
The best way to characterize the state offetal tissue transplant technology
is "experimental"." This may make this area one of the few in bioethics in
which the ethical discussion is ahead of the medical technology. It is
encouraging to see the amount of ethical reflection that is taking place while
the science is still being developed.
One method of treatment of Parkinson's disease that does not involve
fetal tissue was attempted by researchers in both Sweden and Mexico to
transplant cells that also secrete dopamine l2 from the patient's own adrenal
gland. Initial success in these countries was not confirmed in the United
States,13 which has raised skepticism about the accuracy of these early
reports, particularly the experiments in Mexico. Animal experiments with
fetal tissue have, however, met with considerable success. Again in
Sweden l4 and in the United States, 15 transplants offetal tissue into rats have
shown that the tissue, when transplanted, does find its way to the section of
the brain that matches its function physiologically. These advances were
expanded when a 1986 experiment showed success in using fetal tissue in
treating Parkinson's disease that had been induced in monkeys. 16 To date
there have been only a handful oftransplants performed on human beings.
At the November, 1988 annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience,
most of the researchers conceded that the recipients have received little
clinical benefit and they called for more research on animals. 17 Anders
Bjorklund ofthe University of Lund in Sweden, who performed transplants
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on two Parkinson's patients in 1987, reported at these meetings that "the
results have not been impressive" and "the implantations have not had any
clinical significance".18 Though most researchers are optimistic about its
eventual success, there are sharp differences on the timetable, and some call
for more extensive animal research prior to moving forward on human
beings. 19
Should the technology be perfected, it shows promise for application to a
number of other degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's disease,
Huntington's Chorea, spinal cord or other neural injuries. In addition, the
use of fetal liver cells shows promise for treating bone marrow diseases and
blood disorders, and fetal pancreatic cells have been shown to help treat
diabetes.2o
State of the Law
In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, the federal government established
regulations to limit the scope of experimentation on the fetus. In 1974, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare created the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. The regulations recommended by this commission
were adopted the following year. Experiments on the live fetus are
permitted only if the research is therapeutic and there is minimal risk to the
fetus. In cases where critical information cannot be obtained from any other
source, non-therapeutic research is permitted as long as the risk to the fetus
is minimal. Ironically, these regulations protect the fetus, as a subject of
experimentation, in a way almost identical to the way adults are protected,
yet the Roe decision denies the fetus the right to life throughout the entire
pregnancy. Most state laws restrict experiments on live fetuses (as do the
HEW regulations), and the majority of states follow the federal regulations,
with penalties for violation ranging from misdemeanor to homicide.21
The regulations further state that ,any experiments with dead fetuses be
done in accordance with state law. Most states permit the use oftissue from
dead fetuses under the provisions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
which allows next of kin to donate the tissue, similar to organ donation
from cadavers.22 However, eight states (Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio and Oklahoma) prohibit the use of
fetal tissue from dead fetuses,23 and 17 states prohibit the sale of the tissue
and fetal organs.24 The la w in Louisiana has been successfully challenged on
constitutional grounds, that it unduly restricts a woman's right to an
abortion. However, it should be noted that the law was struck down due to
its ambiguity, not any problem in principle.
The current discussion on this issue began in October, 1987 with a
National Institutes of Health request for federal funding to transplant fetal
neural tissue into the brain of a Parkinson's patient. In March, 1988, the
NIH convened a 21-member panel to study the issue. During the panel's
deliberations, in May, the administration announced a moratorium, still in
14
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effect, on federal funding for such research. In December, the panel
published its findings and made the following recommendations as
parameters for research it considered ethically acceptable. 25
1. The decision to abort must be made prior to the discussion of the use
of the tissue.
2. Anonymity is to be maintained between donor and recipient.
3. Timing and method of abortion is not to be influenced by the
possibility of tissue use.
4. Consent of the pregnant woman is necessary and sufficient unless the
husband objects.
5. No financial or other incentives are to be given to the woman who
aborts and thus "donates" the tissue.
Discussion of the Major Positions
1. The Use of Fetal Tissue from Induced Abortions Is Ethically
Acceptable.

This position justifies the use of fetal tissue with varying degrees of
restrictions. The principal difference between those who propose various
limits is that some allow for the mother to designate the recipient ofthe fetal
tissue, while others prohibit recipient designation.
A. Recipient Designation is Ethically Acceptable. This position justifies
not only the use of the tissue from induced abortion, but also recipient
specification of the donated tissue. In addition, conception solely for tissue
donation and even recruiting a surrogate to conceive for the same purpose is
considered ethically acceptable. 26
This position begins with the widely held assumption that it is ethically
acceptable for a woman to have an abortion if it is necessary to save her life.
Though cases like these are rare exceptions in reality, most would justify the
abortion morally in a case like that. The argument proceeds by using a
hypothetical situation in which a pregnant woman learns that someone
close to her has a neurological disease like Parkinson's which may be helped
by fetal tissue. Is it ethically permissible for her to abort for the use of the
fetal tissue? If she may abort to save her own life, if it is in danger, then why
may she not abort to save the life of another? Or if she may abort to relieve
the burdens on herself, may she not also abort to relieve the burdens,
perhaps more serious ones, on another? This position holds that she may in
both cases.
This goes a step further when insisting that there is no moral difference
between a woman already pregnant aborting to use the tissue, and
conceiving in order to abort for the same reason. John A. Robertson of the
University of Texas Law School, states, "As long as abortion of an existing
pregnancy for transplant purposes is ethically accepted, conceiving in order
to abort and procure tissue for transplant should also be ethically
acceptable when necessary to alleviate great suffering in others."27
Proponents of this position acknowledge that some may resist the idea
August, 1991

15

of conception solely for donation purposes due to the social symbolic
significance of honoring life. Yet proponents argue that this symbolic
significance is overruled in most cases by the beneficent effects of the tissue
transplants on the recipient.
The position is extended further in the suggestion that recruitment of a
surrogate to conceive and donate the fetal tissue is also justified. If the need
for tissue histo-compatibility arises, it would be appropriate for someone
who is a match to conceive in order to be a donor. Robertson again states,
"If a relative may provide tissue, why not a stranger who chooses to do so
altruistically?28 When the objection is raised that the woman could become
an organ farm, proponents suggest that the same objection could be made
against anyone who donates organs. In addition, the risk of the woman
being misperceived as a tissue farm should not hinder one from realizing the
positive benefits that the transplants bring.
To guard against possible abuses in this system, some limits are
recommended, namely that the request to donate the tissue be separated
from the consent to abortion, the former being allowed only after the latter
has occurred. In addition, the person who requests consent for the tissue
may not be the one who actually performs the transplant. This is a condition
attached to all organ donations under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
These are suggested in order to prevent coercion of the woman who is
undergoing the abortion to donate the fetal tissue.
Further limits distinguish between selling the tissue, clearly illegal under
the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984,29 and recovering the costs of
retrieval and processing of the tissue. This extends to actually paying the
cost of the abortion if conception is undertaken solely for the purpose of
obtaining the tissue. This is similar to paying for the operation that results in
a kidney, or a section of liver being made available for transplantation.
Many People Uncomfortable
Though the logic of this position seems compelling, many people are
uncomfortable with such an extreme. The idea of conceiving life solely to
terminate it and use the remains strikes most people as morally repugnant
due to the way the fetus is overtly used as a means and not as an end. For
example, a Southern California family recently acknowledged publicly that
the mother had conceived solely to provide a bone marrow match for her
teenage daughter suffering from leukemia.30 This is not a case of conceiving
to terminate and donate the tissue, since the family admitted that they
would not have terminated the pregnancy had they discovered that the fetus
was not histo-compatible. But there were significant ethical concerns raised,
even though there was no intent at any point to terminate the pregnancy.
The child would grow up to enjoy a normal life irrespective of donor
compatibility. The strong reaction in this case where the pregnancy will
continue helps one understand the moral discomfort many feel when
considering the termination of a pregnancy solely for the purpose of
16
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donating tissue. Even if one grants that the fetus may not have full
personhood from the point of conception, it does have some interests and is
entitled to some protection under the law. The fetus is not morally neutral in
the same wayan organ or a piece of tissue is. It is a potential person and it
not to be treated merely as a piece of tissue that is exclusively the property of
the woman. To legitimate the use offetal tissue to this degree is to do more
than symbolically devalue life. It rather makes a powerful statement that life
in the womb can be used without any consideration for its end of becoming
a living human being.
Proponents contend that since it is legitimate to abort to save the life of
the mother, then it is also justified to abort to save the life of another
through the use of the tissue.31 This assumes that fetal tissue transplantation
can actually cure various diseases. Yet the technology is still experimental
and is likely to be for some time. At this time, the best that the technology
can do is to reverse some of the symptoms. In the long run it is simply not
known if the transplants can cure disease, or simply alleviate or reverse
some of the symptoms.
Let us assume that at some point the technology does make it possible to
save another's life. There is another problem with this analogy. There are
actually very few abortions performed in order to save the life of the
mother. They are sought for birth control purposes, to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy. In the rare abortions that are performed to save the
life of the mother, the fetus itself is the threat to the life of the mother, or at
least, its presence in the uterus adds a complication to the mother's
conditic;m that would not otherwise be there. This is clearly not the case with
abortion to donate tissue to save the life of another. This other person, for
whom the pregnancy is being terminated, is no threat to the life of the
mother, and thus the reason for the abortion is entirely different. The closer
equivalent to this is not induced abortion, but ectopic pregnancy.
In addition, the move to the scenario of recruiting a surrogate to conceive
and donate the tissue mistakenly compares fetal tissue transplants to adult
organ donations. Robertson states, "the physical effects of pregnancy and
abortion to produce fetal tissue are roughly comparable to the effects of
kidney or bone marrow donation . . . at this point concerns about fetal
status become less important and the focus shifts toward the welfare of the
donor."32 In the first place, there is confusion about who the donor actually
is, since this is not a case parallel to surrogate motherhood. The donor is
actually the fetus, not the woman who "rents her womb" for the purpose of
securing the tissue. Secondly, this position would indeed turn women into
tissue farms. Robertson attempts to counter this objection by insisting that
this same charge can be made against any living donor of any tissue or
organ. 33 That is, any donor who chooses to donate an organ or tissue also
becomes a tissue farm, a notion that is rejected by those who work in adult
organ transplantation. However this is hardly an exact parallel, since adult
organ donors are not conceived solely for the purpose of donating their
organs ..Thirdly, a fetus in utero about to become a tissue donor and an
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adult cadaver awaiting organ retrieval are very different, since the decision
to abort the fetus was made while the fetus was still alive and developing,
not when it was brain dead. Even if the decision to donate one's organs was
made while still alive, the decision to transplant the organ/ tissue does not
result in the donor's d~ath . This is clearly not the case in the scenario where
the fetus is conceived and aborted in order to donate the tissue. We would
suggest that an exact parallel between conceiving in order to donate the
tissue and adult organ transplantation would surely disqualify a proxy from
any role in the disposition of the cadaver.
Ethical Concerns
The ethical concerns in this position revolve around consent34 and
commercialization of the tissue. Thus the consent to abortion should be
separated from the consent to donate the tissue. This concern is shared by
most who favor fetal tissue transplants from induced abortions. But since
this position attempts to justify recipient designation, the separation of the
two consents would seem to be very difficult to maintain. Given the
publicity that has already and will continue to surround the medical
technology in this area, separating the two consents is both naive and
simplistic. As long as a woman can abort in order to donate tissue to a
person of her designation, the scenario in which a woman is coerced into
conception, abortion and tissue donation is not hard to imagine. Though
the supply of tissue is currently adequate to service the available technology,
it will be overwhelmed by the demand should the technology live up to its
promise, thus contributing to the possibility of coerced consent. This
likelihood of demand outstripping supply is increased by the improved
methods of contraception and the possibility of RU 486 being introduced
into this country. Though the French firm that produces the "abortion pill"
currently has no plans to market the drug here, it is unlikely that the
pressure to make it available can be resisted in the long run. The California
attorney general recently proposed testing of the drug within the state. 35
Should it be marketed, one can easily see how the availability offetal tissue
from family planning abortions would be significantly reduced. In fact, one
can imagine the time when the majority of fetal tissue available for
transplants would come from conceptions and abortions being done
explicitly for that purpose.
There is little doubt about the willingness of women to conceive in order
to provide tissue for an ailing relative. Though none of the offers have yet
been accepted , people have already come forward publicly to state their
willingness to do SO.36 Nor can there be doubt about the availability of
women who would donate tissue for a fee.37 Proponents suggest that there
should be no fee paid, but that retrieval agencies are entitled to recover their
costs. It would not be difficult to hide the fee paid to the woman in the
retrieval of costs, and any prohibition of this would be virtually
unenforceable. For instance, one can easily imagine discounts of some kind
18
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being offered for the abortion procedure. In addition, one of those retrieval
costs would be paying for the abortion in cases where the abortion is
performed strictly for the tissue. 38 It would seem that if this.)Vas adopted,
donating the tissue would be an easy way to finance one's abortion, and the
motives behind the decision to abort would become very difficult to sort
out. This would further complicate the efforts to separate the consent to an
abortion and the consent to the tissue donation, and would make the
attempt to avoid commercialization of the tissue difficult.
B. Recipient Designation is Ethically Unacceptable.
This is essentially the position of the Fetal Tissue Transplantation Panel
that was commissioned by the NIH. This position has most recently been
adopted, with some modifications, by the Ethics Committee of Stanford
Medical School.39 Proponents acknowledge that tissue from induced
abortions may be used ethically, but places significant restrictions on
recipient designation and benefits to the pregnant woman. The principal
purpose for these restrictions is to avoid the marketing of fetal tissue and the
conception of fetus for the purpose if terminating it in order to use the tissue
for another's benefit. Both of these are considered violations of the dignity
oflife by treating the fetus as a medical product and the uterus as a factory.40
The position itself is spelled out by the response of the NIH Panel to ten
specific questions put to it by the Assistant Secretary of Health.41 These
questions are as follows:

1. Is an induced abortion of moral relevance to the decision to use human
fetal tissue for research? Would the answer to this question provide any
insight on whether and how this research should proceed?
The panel concluded that induced abortion as the source of the tissue is
morally relevant, but is subordinate to the benefits that arise out of the use
of the tissue. However, to keep the two issues separate, the panel
recommended that the decisions to end a pregnancy and donate the tissue
be kept separate; compensation be limited to expenses incurred on
obtaining the tissue; everyone involved in the transplantation procedure be
informed of the source of the tissue; a respect parallel to that given non-fetal
cadavers be maintained. It was emphasized that abortion is legal, but that
questions of law and morality are not the same. There seemed to be some
ambivalence among the panel on this question, since it states that its
support for the use of tissue should not be taken as a similar support for
abortion. The majority accepted the legitimacy of the transplants based on
the legality, not the morality of abortion.
2. Does the use of fetal tissue in research encourage women to have an
abortion which they might not otherwise undertake? Ifso, are there ways to
minimize such encouragement?
The panel cited no evidence that the use of or need for fetal tissue would
encourage a higher incidence of abortion, while admiting that there has
been minimal public exposure to the possibilities for which this tissue can
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serve. The consensus of the panel was that this was unlikely to be a further
encouragement of abortion, given the complex and varied reasons that
cause a woman to have an abortion. However, it acknowledged that
minimizing encouragement to abortions that would not normally occur
was good, and recommended that any decision to abort must precede any
discussion of and request for donation of fetal tissue. In addition, there
should not be any recipient-designation on the part ofthe pregnant woman.

3. As a legal matter, does the very process of obtaining informed consent
from the pregnant woman constitute a prohibited "inducement" to
terminate the pregnancy for the purposes of the research, thus precluding
research of this sort under H HS regulations?
There was clear consensus that a woman should not be coerced into
furnishing fetal tissue for transplantation, and that the process of informed
consent is not inherently coercive. But they did acknowledge the difficulty
of isolating the consent to abortion from the growing public knowledge of
fetal tissue transplants. They recommended that anonymity be maintained
between donor and recipient and that even ifthe woman asks directly about
the use of the tissue in the process of consenting to the abortion, no
guarantees be given about the use of the tissue. In addition, the timing and
method of abortion should not be biased by the retrieval of the tissue.

4. Is maternal consent a sufficient condition for the use of the tissue, or
should additional consent be obtained? If so, what should be the substance
and who should be the source(s) of the consent, and what procedures
should be implemented to obtain it?
There was consensus that no tissue should be used without the consent of
the pregnant woman, and that consent should be obtained in accordance
with the UAGA. Unless the father objects, her consent is sufficient.
The panel emphasized that the woman's role in abortion does not
disqualify her from giving consent as the next of kin for her fetal cadaver.
There were three dissenters on this question , and this becomes a significant
issue in the Bopp / Burtchaell dissent referred to earlier. 42

5. Should there be and could there be a prohibition on the donation offetal
tissue between family members, or friends and acquaintances? Would a
prohibition on donation betweenfamily membersjeopardize the likelihood
of clinical success?
The panel held unanimously that there should be no abortions for the
purpose or with the result that persons designated by the woman would
receive the fetal tissue. In most cases, the person designated would be a
family member or close relative. The panel strongly opposed encouraging
abortions for this purpose and this prohibition would have no impact on the
clinical success of the transplants. Interestingly, the panel did admit that if
medical technology developed to the point where diseases could be treated
with fetal tissue which required a relationship between the recipient and the
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fetus for clinical success, that may be a sufficient reason to modify the
prohibition. They encouraged the NIH to review the circumstances at
regular occurrences.
6. If transplantation using fetal tissue from induced abortions becomes
more common, what impact is likely to occur on activities and procedures
employed by abortion clinics? In particular, is the optimal or safest way to
perform an abortion likely to be in conflict with the preservation ofthe fetal
tissue? Is there any way to ensure that induced abortions are not
intentionally delayed in order to have a second trimester fetusfor research
and transplantation?

Here again, the panel affirmed its separation of consent for abortion and
for tissue retrieval, and that no fees be paid to the donating woman. It
acknowledged the probablility that demand for the tissue could outstrip
supply due to more effective contraception, pharmacological abortion (R U
486) and greater develpment of the technology. The pressure which that
places on abortion clinics would be clear ifthey begin to profit from selling
the tissue. Enforcement of the regulations prohibiting the sale of the tissue,
and monitoring the books of the clinics to ensure that expenses incurred in
the retrieval of the tissue don't mask a profit, were emphasized by the panel
as being critical.
7. What actual steps are involved in procuring the tissue from the source to
the researcher? Are there any paymeilts involved? What types ofpayments
in this situation, if any, would fall inside or outside the scope of the Hyde
Amendment?

Normally, the abortion, retrieval and research take place within the same
institution, with exceptions being that medical researchers have obtained
tissue from independent abortion clinics. However, more recently there
have arisen retrieval agencies which provide the tissue for research. Most of
these are non-profit organizations which pay the clinic a fee that covers the
cost of retrieving the tissue. They then pass on the tissue, and the retrieval
costs, to the research institutions.
The panel emphasized that there should be no payments for the tissue
other than expenses incurred. They cited no available evidence that women
who abort are paid anything for their donation of tissue, and they stressed
that more specifics are needed to define what constitutes legitimate
expenses.
Questions eight and nine are not particularly relevant for outlining the
NIH panel's basic position. They deal with the state ofthe law and how that
affects NIH funding (question eight) and whether adequate animal
experiments have been performed to justify moving forward in human
beings (question nine). To the latter, the panel answered in the affirmative
as it relates to Parkinson's disease and diabetes. In diseases such as
Alzheimer's disease, Huntington's Chorea, and spinal cord injuries, further
animal studies were urged.
A.ugust, 1991
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10. What is the likelihood that transplantation usingfetal cell cultures will
be successful? Will this obviate the needfor freshfetal tissue? In what time
frame might this occur?

Established cell lines maintained in cultures are an alternative which
could reduce the need for fetal tissue. Though the panel's experts were
encouraging about the prospects, they admitted that it is probably 10 years
away from being a viable alternative.
Some of the same criticisms of the previous position which attempted to
justify recipient designation apply to this attempt to draw some boundaries
around the practice. For instance, even though recipient designation is
prohibited here, keeping the two necessary consents separate is still more
difficult than proponents admit. For this to be done effectively would
involve monitoring ofthe counseling and consent processes in a way which
current resources do not permit.
A further problem is that keeping financial inducements from being a
factor in the process is unenforceable. Again, this would take a degree of
monitoring which cannot be provided. Given the already profitable
abortion industry, the prospects of dramatically increased demand (and
possibly decreased supply of fetal tissue), and the desperation of the
recipients, in many cases with terrible diseases, the market forces at work
are underestimated by the proponents. There are numerous "creative" ways
to financially induce the woman undergoing abortion to donate the tissue
that are on a practical scale, impossible to detect and police. Even with the
restrictions on payments to aborting women, it seems inevitable that
commercialization of the industry will occur and that we will be trafficking
in human tissue. Finally, the parallel to human organ transplants that is
used as justification for the process is flawed. The comparison is made to
organ donation from one who has been tragically killed, perhaps as a result
of a drunk driver. Just as we routinely separate out involvement with the
process of death from the retrieval of organs, the proponents suggest that
the same is possible here. However, the tissue obtained from induced
abortion is not at all like the organs donated by someone killed in a tragedy.
Here there is an intentionality in making the tissue available that does not
exist in normal organ donation. There is no parallel to the unintended death
(at least unintended by the one who makes the tissue available) which
produces an adult cadaver, since the one who consents to the donation is the
direct cause of the donor's death. This seriously undermines the legitimating
parallel and ethically compromises the fetal tissue donation.
Proponents' Likely Response
The proponents of this position would likely respond to some of these
criticisms by asserting both the legality of abortion and the availability of
the tissue. The tissue is there, they would argue, and will likely continue to
be available for the foreseeable future. Why not put it to good use? Some
might suggest that there is even a responsibility to use the tissue since it
22
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can help suffering people. Thus they would insist on separating the use of
the tissue from its retrieval.
In response, how the tissue is obtained does make a moral difference. The
means as well as the ends have moral significance. Given the necessity of an
institutional partnership between the transplant facilities and the abortion
clinics for the best medical results, separating the use of the tissue from its
retrieval is not as dear cut as the proponents would like to believe. Here
there does seem to be a parallel between these transplants and the Nazi
doctors' experiments on hypothermia. Many would hold that it was
immoral for them to use the information gained from experiments on Jews
obtained by force. Even though the physicians were not the ones who
actually brought the subjects in for the experiments, they had proximity to
those who did, and were pulled into the field of moral responsibility. The
current debate on whether scientists today can use that research is different
from the question of whether ornot the Nazi scientists were morally free to
use that information. Today researchers desiring to use that information
have no proximity to how that information was obtained, and many would
argue that it is morally justified today to use that information. But the
parallel with fetal tissue transplants is not the current debate on the present
use of the Nazi information. Rather, it is the Nazi scientists who had
proximity to the way in which the subjects were procured that forms the
more fitting parallel. One can certainly oppose the termination of a
pregnancy, irrespective of one's convictions about the freedom of choice,
and still support the use of the tissue. But one can do this consistently only if
one is no longer in the position to affect how it is obtained, that is, no longer
has proximity to the retrieval of the tissue. Even though one is dealing with
two dead cadavers in both adult organ transplantation and fetal tissue
transplants, the causative element in the latter ethically compromises the
use of the tissue. 43
2. Fetal Tissue Transplants from Induced Abortions Are Ethically
Unacceptable
A second position prohibits the use of all fetal tissue obtained from
induced abortions. Due to the complicity with abortion, which when done
for family planning purposes cannot in any sense be considered a good (the
good would be the freedom to exercise reproductive choice), Any use of
fetal tissue obtained in this way is thus morally tainted. In addition, this
position recognizes the difficulty with which lines are drawn that restrict the
use of the tissue, and argues that there is nothing to prevent one from ending
up with the commercialization of organs and human tissue.44
The first argument comes from the inability to establish rightful consent
for the process. To date, fetal tissue transplants are treated as any other
cadaveric transplants under the U AGA, thus requiring consent of next of
kin. The UAGA and the NIH panel both fail to recognize the distinction
between normal organ transplants and the use of fetal tissue. In the case of
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fetal tissue, the mother is presumed to be the one who gives consent to the
use of the tissue for the transplant (or for some other form of
experimentation). According to the normal understanding of proxy
consent, her role assumes that she is acting in the best interest of the child.
Yet she is also the one who has authorized the terminating of the pregnancy
in the abortion. Ethicist Paul Ramsey concludes that it is morally
outrageous and a ~harade to give the woman who aborts any right to proxy
consent for the donation of or experimentation on the aborted fetus's body
parts.4S Bopp and Burtchaell conclude in their dissent from the NIH panel
report that, "We can think of no sound precedent for putting a living human
into the power of such an estranged person, not for his or her own welfare,
but for the 'interests' of the one in power."46
. Ironically, some who support fetal tissue transplants have argued that the
aborted fetus would have "desired" to help those suffering from various
diseases which the tissue ,would benefit. This idea offetal desire was first put
forth in the attempt to justify research on living, non-viable fetuses , as a
corollary to the concept of consent based on proximity to the fetus. Case
Western University professor Mary Mahowald and her team use this
concept tO'help justify not only experiments but transplants, and appeal to
Richard McCormick's conGept that children (however, he was arguing for
the obligation of children, not fetuses as research subjects, not transplant
donors), as members of the moral community, have a responsibility to be
subjects in research which will benefit that community. When they make
this appeal, they are caught between affirming that the fetus has a
responsibility as part ofthe moral community, yet has been excluded from
the sam~ community since it has no recognized right to life.47
One may object to the need for consent in the first place, if the fetus is not
recognized as a person. Yet this fails to recognize why fetal tissue is so
valuable. It is precisely because it is human tissue. Biologically, the fetus is
much more than an organ or a piece of tissue. It is a developing human
being with potential for full personhood and thus the potential for full
membership in the moral community from the time of conception. It is not
necessary here to argue that the fetus has full personhood from the time of
conception, only that its potential to assume personhood makes it
qualitatively different from an organ or other piece of tissue. It should be
noted that we are not conceding that the fetus is not a fully human person
with the right to life, only insisting that one can oppose fetal tissue
transplants from induced abortions without insisting on the full
personhood of the fetus. We hold that the fetus does indeed have the right to
life as a fully human person.
Related to the concept of consent is the status of fetal tissue transplants as
gifts and the fetus as donor under the UAGA. Since the fetus presumably
has no value, it is difficult to see how the tissue can be legitimately regarded
as a gift and the fetus as a donor. Few seem prepared to reject the
framework of the UAGA to govern the use of fetal tissue. Yet the
inadequacy ofthe language to describe the "gift" of a fetus reflects a strange
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ambivalence about the nature of the fetus . A more significant conceptual
problem is encountered when one considers that the fetus is simultaneously
both a donation and a donor. It is difficult to see how the fetus can be called
a donor under the UAGA in parallel to an adult organ donor, if the features
that give the fetus potential personhood are discounted. When the donation
of fetal tissue has the connotation of a gift, only the non-induced abortion
can actually stand on a moral basis, since these fetuses were only unable,
and not unwelcome, to join the human community.48
Greater Incentive to Abortion

Even some of the advocates of the tissue transplants acknowledge that it
may create a greater incentive to abortion, or may lead women to decide for
abortion who wouldn't otherwise. 49 This argument against the transplants
distinguishes between abortion and the freedom to choose the abortion.
Few, if any, would call the act of terminating a pregnancy a good . What is
considered the good is the freedom to choose an abortion, not the act itself.
Many pro-choice advocates are increasingly uncomfortable with the
number of abortions performed in this country. Many see the increased
effectiveness of contraception as a good for precisely this reason; that it
prevents the trauma and tragedy of abortion. Even support for R U 486 is
premised on this same notion. Thus, anything that would increase the
incidence of abortion cannot be a good . Though our society recognizes the
legality of abortion, we have never seen fit to actively encourage it.
The use of fetal tissue from induced abortion legitimizes abortion by
"redeeming" it. As the medical technology necessary for effective
transplantation advances, and the transplants themselves become more
common, it is difficult to see how this will not desensitize society to what is
involved in elective abortion, making it more morally neutral.
In addition, the use of fetal tissue for transplants forms a symbiotic
relationship with the abortion industry. 50 Given the future prospects of the
science and the overwhelming numbers of people with diseases that fetal
tissue could potentially help, the financial incentives for securing the tissue
are powerful. It is hard to see how an already profitable industry could resist
the urge to "cash in" on this potentially very lucrative relationship with the
practitioners of fetal tissue transplants. This sets up the possibilities for
abuse about which even the advocates are wary. Already there have been
people not simply willing but eager to conceive just to donate the tissue.51
Fetal tissue is currently being used to make cosmetics in Sweden and fetal
kidneys from Brazil and India are being sold in West Germany to
physicians for transplant.5 2 1t is true that most advocates recommend some
laws or voluntary guidelines to keep such abuses from taking place. These
may be adequate for the short run, but there are no guarantees that these
kinds of abuses can be prevented in the long run as the process becomes
more acceptable. Thus this approach is not " burning down the house to
roast the pig", but rather, stopping the descent down the slippery slope at
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the top. It is naive to think that the long run pressure can be resisted, given
the powerful incentives to donate the tissue that the advances in medical
science promise to provide.
Finally, there is a sense of complicity with abortions already performed.
Here the advocates of this position use the parallel ofthe Nazi scientists. It is
important to notice that the parallel does not preclude the later use of
information by generations that had nothing to do with the Nazi horrors.
Rather, the comparison is to the Nazi scientists themselves, who, by their
proximity to the abuse of human rights are "pulled into the gravity field of
responsibility for the violent act which supplies them with vanquished
human bodies for research."53 It is important to realize that what is being
considered is an institutional partnership with the abortion industry, for
which some are requesting federal funding. The better parallel might be a
banker who morally evaluates the drug trade to be a tragedy, but who
agrees to accept drug money at his bank in order to finance low income
housing for the community. There would be little doubt that the banker is
involved in complicity with the drug trade, and perhaps giving it legitimacy,
even though he is not involved with the actual sale of narcotics. LeRoy
Walters, the chairman of the Ethical and Legal Issues of the NIH panel said
in 1974, when only experimentation with the fetus was being deliberated:
Ought one to make experimental use of the products of an abortion system, when
one would object on ethical grounds to many or most of the abortions performed
within a system? If a particular hospital became the beneficiary of an organized
homicide system which provided a fresh supply of cadavers, one would bejustified
in raising questions about the moral appropriateness of the hospital's continuing
cooperation with the suppliers.54

Summary of Position
We are opposed to fetal tissue transplants in which the source of the tissue
is induced abortion. We do support as an alternative the use of cadaver
tissue from spontaneous abortions or ectopic pregnancies. 55
The following constitute a summary of the rationale for this position:
I) Fetal transplantation is inconsistent with the VA GAframework in which
it is supposed to be governed.
Throughout all the discussion of fetal transplants, the framework of the
UAGA is either assumed or explicitly invoked. Part and parcel of this
parallel is the one between the dead fetus and the adult cadaver as donor.
With the rise offetal tissue transplant technology, the U AGA was expanded
to include the fetus under its rubric. The use of the tissue from induced
abortion is inconsistent with this framework , since:
A) Valid consent is impossible. The mother cannot be considered a legimate
proxy, having authorized the termination of the pregnancy. Elimination of
consent, however, would further objectify the fetus and be inconsistent with
the fact that biologically, the developing fetus does not represent the woman's
tissue. It would be well to avoid the notion of the fetus as the source of
biological "spare parts", a notion reminiscent of Huxley's Brave New World.56
26

Linacre Quarterly

B) There is an equation ofthe donor and the donation oftissue. This is not a
parallel to surrogate motherhood where the mother is viewed as the donor
and the tissue as the donation. Mahowald and associates equate the "moral
problems thus raised (in fetal tissue transplants) to those that may occur in
surrogate motherhood." They earlier state that, "With fetal tissue
transplantation (as with transplantation in general), a bad effect (loss of an
organ or tissue) is suffered for the sake of the recipient, and there is no
similarly bad effect in surrogacy." Their suggestion that this parallel helps
provide some of the guidelines for fetal tissue transplantation ignores the
obvious discontinuity, that the death of the fetus results from the
transplants . This is hardly only a bad effect, it is the destruction of the
fetus. 57
C) The gift cannot be both priceless and worthless at the same time. In fact,
the use of the term "gift" is inappropriate when induced abortion is the
means by which the gift is made available.
D) Thefetus is not an organ donor in the same wayan adult cadaver is. since
the proxy who gives consent is the agent of the termination of the
pregnancy. Only miscarriages and ectopic pregnancies actually fit this
parallel.
Nolan summarizes the alternative of rejecting the U AGA framework for
fetal tissue transplants:
If we reject the framework of the UAGA, we seem doomed to accept arguments
that implicitly or explicitly equate fetuses with things or beings that are notamong them kidneys, tumors and discarded surgical speci mens. Yet biologically,
the fetus is not a tissue or an organ but a body, and morally, the fetus is a
developing being and potential member of the human community. Fetal remains
accordingly ought to evoke emotions and protections beyond those given
tumorous tissue or unwanted organs. 58

2) Most of the restrictions proposed by proponents are unenforceable.
A) Given the increasing public awareness of the medical technology and
the growing benefits that will occur, keeping the two distinct acts of
consents separate is virtually impossible. All of the proposed guidelines
treat this as one of the non-negotiable aspects of the transplants. It would
not be difficult to imagine that, given separate consent forms coercion to
donate the tissue would not enter in, in spite of the potential transplant
benefits, the likely scarcity of available tissue as the technology develops
and the vulnerability of the women in anticipating an abortion.
B) Given the potentially lucrative market for the transplants, keeping
financial inducements from entering in would be difficult and impossible to
enforece. For example, Hana Biologics, one of the firms testifying before the
NI H panel, estimates that total market for using the fetal pancreatic tissue to
trea t diabetes amounts to approximately six billion dollars annually.59 This
has the potential to become very big business. Abortion clinics stand to reap
a substantial increase in revenue simply from the small amount (on average,
$25 / organ, multiplied by the hundreds of thousands of abortions performed
annually) that the non-profit acquisition organizations offer. The financial
incentives to "recruit" fetal tissue donors would be significant. There are
numerous non-cash ways which are difficult to detect and impossible to
adequately police which would be especially appealing to poor and minority
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women. For example, the clinic could offer a "discount" on the abortion
procedure itself or provide a promise to provide future medical care for a
specified time period following the donation of the tissue. With the
anticipated profitability of the industry, once the technology can alleviate a
larger number of diseases, there will be increasing pressures to "share the
wealth" being produced by these transplants.
A recent California court decision may set a precedent that will make it
more difficult to prevent women from obtaining compensation for the donation of fetal tissue. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, an
appeals court reversing a lower court decision ruled that a person does have a
property interest in his own cells. 60 In treatment for leukemia, doctors at the
UCLA Medical Center removed the spleen of a Mr. Moore, and discovered
that they could manufacture, from that tissue, a cell line which was effective in
slowing certain types of leukemia. The medical center then sought out a
commercial arrangement with a pharmaceutical company to market the cell
line. When asked for his consent, Moore refused and sued the University for
his share of any profit resulting from the cell line. Though the court did not
rule on his right to compensation, they did hold that individuals have a
property interest in their own cells, and thus a right to control what becomes
of their tissues. One can see how this could open the door not only to financial
inducements but to a right to compensation for fetal tissue donation.
C) This potentially lucrative market will make it increasingly difficult to
enforce another of the proponents' guidelines, that of the separation of the
transplant physician/researcher and the one who performs the abortion.
For the best medical results there must be an institutional, symbiotic
relationship with the abortion industry, thereby making the separation of
abortion and tissue procurement very difficult. This partnership will also
make it more complicated to isolate the timing and method of abortion
from what is necessary to procure the best possible tissue. Mahowald and
associates already propose that pregnancies be prolonged and the method
of abortion be modified, if necessary, in order to maximize the procurement
of the tissue. 61 In addition, some acknowledge the legitimate possibility that
tissue be removed from live, non-viable fetuses.
3) The use of fetal tissue transplants from induced abortios will serve to
enhance abortion's image, or at least make it morally neutral. At a
minimum, the possibility of donating tissue will relieve some of the guilt
that many women feel when electing abortion, thus alleviating some ofthe
ambivalence that usually accompanies it. Though our society recognizes the
right to choose abortion, abortion is not itself recognized as a good. The
prospect of donating tissue is not likely to dramatically increase the
incidence of abortion unless recipient designation is allowed. But it would
certainly contribute to the decision to abort and might push some women
"over the line" in their decision. The routine retrieval of the tissue would no
doubt make the death of the fetus seem less tragic. Nolan puts it this way:
"Enhancing abortion's image could thus be expected to undermine efforts
to make it as little needed and little used a procedure as possible. "62 Though
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it is true that the use of tissue for research has not increased the incidence of
abortion, the use for transplants produces concrete benefits rather than
research possibilities and statistical lives, thus undermining the comparison.
Studies show that there is great ambivalence toward abortion among the
women considering it. There is usually intense anxiety during the final 24
hours before the abortion is performed. Studies of pregnant women
choosing abortion show that between one-third and 40 percent change their
mind at least once, and around 30 percent do not finally make up their mind
until just prior to the procedure.63 Thus, it is likely that the prospect of
solace over the guilt that usually accompanies abortion will enter into the
complex set of factors which are involved in the decision to abort. The
possibility of "redeeming abortion" throws a powerful human motivation
into the already complex calculus. That will have an effect on that one-third
to 40 percent who change their mind during the process. Bopp and
Burtchaell in their dissent from the panel report state,
It is willful fantasy to imagine that young pregnant women estranged from their
families and their sexual partners, and tom by the knowledge that they are with
child, will not be powerfully relieved at the prospect that the sad act of violence
they are reluctant to accept can now have redemptive value. 64

4) Some of the abuses that the proponents' regulations are designed to
prohibit are already being seriously proposed. These are primarily those
dealing with recipient designation of the tissue. Though short-term wedges
can be placed along the slippery slope, given the promise of the technology,
it is doubtful that long-term pressures can be resisted to allow women to
conceive in order to abort and thus donate the tissue. As interest groups,
many of whom testified before the NIH Panel, become more dependent on
the tissue, they will likely begin to press their "rights" to the tissue, further
complicating the ability of society to draw lines on the slippery slope.
5) There is a valid alternative - the combination of the use of tissue
from spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies for both transplant
and the development of cell cultures of the most promising tissue. It is true
that some of the diseases for which fetal tissue is being used require tissue
from the second trimester, the cells from first trimester tissue are being
developed and frozen in cultures for later use. This is already being done for
aiabetes and the development of neuroblastoma cells shows similar promise
for treating Parkinson's disease.6s The American Paralysis Association's
statement to the NIH panel encouraged adequate funding to develop tissue
cloning that will bypass the need for the fetus per se.66
The position put forward is essentially that of the British Medical
Association in its interim guidelines. 67 The first of these guidelines is the
most relevant for this section: "Tissue may be obtained only from dead
foetuses resulting from therapeutic or spontaneous abortion."
Conclusion
One would wish that there were not ethical difficulties involved with fetal
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tissue transplants, since they hold promise for treating various kinds of
diseases. But given the inconsistency of fetal tissue transplants with the
U AG A framework, the unenforceability of the restrictions, the likelihood
that the transplants will increase the incidence of abortion, or at least make
it more morally neutral, the serious proposals of some of the abuses that the
restrictions are designed to prohibit and the combination of tissue from
spontaneous abortions, ectopic pregnancies, and cell cultures as a valid
alternative, we would support the continuation of the moratorium on
research and transplants of fetal tissue from induced abortions. One hopes
for the day when cell culture technology has advanced to the point where
fetal tissue from induced abortions is no longer necessary.
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